Introduction
Over the past thirty years, female representation in the world's legislatures has increased in tandem with the rise of women in the labor force. [ figure 1 ] As the literature suggests, there are a number of reasons why this might be so: on the demand side, voters who are accustomed to women in the workforce may be more open to women in political leadership roles as well; on the supply side, professional women with good education and managerial experience are more likely to be viable candidates; or more broadly, changes in social mores can lower the barriers to women in both the economic and political realms simultaneously. As parents increasingly begin to prepare their daughters for professional careers, gender norms become less differentiated and so presumably do any reasons to prefer men over women for political jobs.
Our exploration of the data finds support for all of these contentions up to a point, but none of the explanations on offer makes sense of the fact that, broad trends notwithstanding, female political representation falls far behind women's advances in the labor market in some countries such as the U.S. We account for the otherwise puzzling variation in how female labor force participation maps onto female political representation by considering political representation as a labor market in its own right.
Because women are more likely than men to interrupt their careers for childrearing and other family work, women are disadvantaged in labor markets --including the market for representation --where there are increasing returns to specific human capital. Because women are, statistically speaking, a bad bet as someone who will invest in a lifelong career, women are less competitive for careers that place a premium on skill acquisition on the job and that therefore reward seniority. The U.S. case is illustrative: whereas labor markets in the U.S. are generally fluid and make little use of firm-specific skills that accrue value over time, the U.S. Congress is famous for a link between seniority and legislative effectiveness. It is primarily for this reason, we suggest, that American women have substantially higher representation in the private sector labor markets than in Congress. The situation is reversed in the proportional representation countries of Europe: the private sector labor market is generally more rigid and reliant on workers with specific (ie, not easily transferable) skills, giving firms an incentive to hire and promote men in whom to invest over an entire career, whereas female labor political representation on party-controlled lists is unimpeded by the need for personal effectiveness and hence seniority. In these countries (outside Scandinavia, about which we will say more), the numbers on female political representation are more impressive We suggest that the nature of the political market is a powerful intervening factor in voters' demand for female politicians. On the one hand, higher female labor force participation increases the demand for female representatives because working women have different preferences than their husbands, and parties respond to this shift in voter preferences by signaling attentiveness to these concerns by fielding female candidates.
On the other hand, however, even female voters may prefer to elect a man in a system that rewards seniority because a man is likely to stay longer in office, acquire more experience, better committee positions, etc., and therefore to be more effective in representing their interests. Because of these countervailing concerns, we expect female political representation to be lower in systems with a personalistic bias and hence a premium on the representative's seniority, holding female labor market participation constant.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature on the link between labor markets and political representation. Section 3 sketches out our argument in greater detail, laying out testable hypotheses. Section 4 presents our empirical results, which is an examination of pooled cross sectional-time series data for 23 countries, examining the causes of both cross-national and intertemporal variation. It shows in a very unambiguous way how the effects of structural forces of change, especially rising female labor force participation, are conditioned by electoral rules and the different role of political parties.
Women in Labor Markets, Women in Government: A Literature Review
In this section we review existing explanations as to why, and the extent to which, work experience is relevant to female political representation. First wave feminism, represented by the work of J.S. Mill and Harriet Taylor Mill (1869) , of course predates the question of how female labor market participation affects female political representation. But the Mills' normative analysis points towards an expectation that females would not bother to inform themselves if they did not have the ability to vote, and that voters would not want female political representation unless females were full participants in society, with knowledge and experience relevant to the full range of issues that concern voting citizens.
1 The Mills decried British coverture laws, under which fathers or husbands owned the labor of dependents including wives. As long as women are not allowed to own their labor, they argued, women lack the motivation or capacity to be morally responsible. Without resources of their own, females connive to get what they want from males, and being disenfranchised they have no incentive to become informed and constructive citizens. We can imagine, by extension, that the Mills would have expected female labor force participation to increase female representation by making women more informed about their interests and more capable of acting on them.
"Second wave" feminists (Friedan, Hochschild, Hartmann) pointed out that legal rights, championed by the Mills and others, did not guarantee gender equality in the labor market, and one might think that sexual discrimination barred females from advancing in economic and political realms at the same time (Hill 1981) . While generalized sexual discrimination was doubtless a hampering factor to women in every area of endeavor, women in recent decades have nevertheless joined the workforce as demand for female labor has risen, principally in the service sector where male brawn does not command a premium (Iversen and Rosenbluth 2007) . Indeed, Rindfuss, Brewster, and Kavee (1996) have shown that, in the U.S. from the 1960s to the 1990s, attitudes towards women's roles have liberalized after women joined the workforce-rather than changing in advance and leading the way for female labor force participation.
Demand side explanations of female political representation focus on how women in the labor market have changed voters' preferences, pulling female political representation along with a lag. There are, in turn, several mechanisms through which changes in attitudes could make it easier for female politicians to win elections. Once public opinion loosens its attitudes towards appropriate levels of gender specialization, and traditional gender roles, the public is less resistant to voting women into public office. For sociologists such as Janet Saltzman Chafetz (1990) , wage labor increases the status of women, which influences women's effectiveness in garnering power in other realms of society, including politics. This view emphasizes a lessening of anti-female discrimination as an enabling condition for female political success, but it is also possible that women's preferences themselves change as women enter the labor force. Not only are working women more likely to vote (Welch 1977 These findings resonate with studies by Oakes and Almquist (1993) and Matland (1998) , which find little connection between female labor force participation and female political representation in agricultural economies in which large proportions of women work in the fields. Matland suggests that subsistence-level primary sector work in the developing world is unlikely to have an "empowering and consciousness raising effect" that would make these women seek a direct political voice (Matland 1998: 118) . Kenworthy and Malami would probably agree, though they are specifically concerned with what kinds of work are conducive to political candidacy, for either men or women.
Kenworthy and Malami's data are compelling evidence of a supply side effect, but the broad-strokes picture leaves some jarring anomalies, including the U.S. case. There are more professional women --by which they mean lawyers, educators, journalists, and business professional --in the U.S. economy than in any other economy in the world.
And yet, female political representation in the U.S. is notoriously low. The scholarly consensus blames the single member district system (Studlar, McAllister, and Ascui 1988; Norris 1993; Rule and Zimmerman 1994) , and we agree, but relatively little is known about the mechanism by which plurality rules harm female candidates. 4 In the section that follows, we propose a way to think about the labor market attributes of political careers. This leads us to consider not only district magnitude, but the variety of ways that electoral rules may increase returns to seniority, thereby disadvantaging women because of their greater likelihood to interrupt their careers for family work.
Electoral Rules, Parties, and the Demand for Female Representation
Political scientists were well structured and frictionless, female political representation would not matter, since politicians would aim to construct and implement policies that the electorate favors.
For now, we set aside the question of how policies would differ if representation were more proportional to gender, and note only the obvious fact that the extraordinary underrepresentation of women in many countries is beyond ratios that could happen randomly if everything about male and female candidates were equal.
We have reviewed a variety of ways male and female candidates have been thought by the scholarly literature to be unequal, from general discriminatory attitudes towards women in leadership roles to the unavailability of qualified female candidates. Without denying either attitudinal factors or the supply of suitable women candidates, we suggest that both of these may be at least partly endogenous to incentives created by electoral rules that govern women's chances to perform their jobs well. To the extent that political representation entails the use of human qualities and capacities that are found equally across males and females, we should expect both sexes to be represented in rough equality over time and place. Any deviation from rough equality is likely to entail some forms of voter discrimination or barriers to entry. But presumably voters and parties alike maximize their policy preferences by choosing the most competent candidates, and why should competency be related to gender? Or more precisely, why should gender matter even after taking account of female labor force participation, career patterns, and education (which is likely to affect preparedness for political careers)? We suggest that the reason is to be found in the kind of human capital investment that political careers presuppose and that men are in a better position to undertake. Because political systems differ systematically in terms of the type of human capital needed for effective representation, we should expect males and females to be elected into office at different rates.
Our logic rests on the insight by labor economists Mincer (1962 , 1974 ) and Polachek (1975 , who argued that when labor productivity rests on specific human capital, workers who interrupt their careers (such as, for example, child rearing or other family work) will be less valuable to their employers. Employers who utilize production methods that make use of specific human capital either should avoid hiring women, stunting female employment rates, or should pay females at lower rates to reflect their lower expected value to the firm, generating a gender wage gap. The implication of their work is that the actuarial difference in leave rates taken by females compared to males can generate "statistical discrimination" where otherwise negative stereotypes do not exist.
The Mincer/Polachek prediction seems to be borne out in a number of empirical studies of labor markets that show that female labor force participation rates and/or gender wage equality, all else equal, tend to be higher in liberal market economies where labor markets are relatively fluid because there is a lower expectation of returns on long term investment in specific human capital (Estevez-Abe, Iversen, and Soskice 2001; EstevezAbe 2002; Iversen and Rosenbluth 2006) . In coordinated market economies, where firms expect to hold employees throughout a long career, females are at a disadvantage because they are known to be more likely to interrupt their careers and thereby reduce the return to firms' investments in their human capital. It is impossible to ignore the paradox, or perhaps political dilemma, that labor market policies designed at least in part to protect the worker from mercurial dismissals and from business cycle vagaries in fact systematically undermine the competitiveness of females relative to males in one fell swoop.
5
We suggest that there is a parallel phenomenon in the labor markets for elected officials as well. Specific human capital, proxied by seniority, is more electorally valuable in some political systems than others. For our purposes, the key dimension on which electoral systems differ is the degree of intra-party competition required for electoral success (Cox 1987) . Where members of the same party must compete with one another to win the party's nomination, such as in party primaries, or compete with one another in the election itself, such as in multi-member district systems, politicians contest elections by making personalistic appeals to voters. In these systems, seniority is a valuable tool with which to take credit for government resources that can be dispensed to constituents in building a personal following. By contrast, where party leadership is centralized and elections are contested on a common party platform, the reputation of the party and the strength of its platform take on greater importance than the popularity or pledges of the individual candidate. Seniority (and other ways to access money) are less valuable assets in strong party systems than in systems where politicians must ensure a personal following that extends beyond partisan loyalties.
If our analysis is right, it should come as no surprise that female political representation in the U.S. is lower than theories based on voter demand or candidate supply would suggest. Electoral politics in the U.S. begins with primaries in which candidates must compete against co-partisans. While party discipline is by no means absent in the U.S., it is certainly weaker in presidential systems generally than in parliamentary systems where the constant possibility of no-confidence votes binds together the political fates of copartisans. Seniority, and the possibilities of constituency service it entails, is guarded jealously in systems where the party's platform does not overwhelm other possible strategies for electoral success. Whatever one thinks about personalistic versus partybased electoral competition, the consequences for female candidates may be as damaging in the political arena as we have seen it to be in private sector labor markets.
More generally, when effective candidates have to develop long-term ties to their constituents and to other politicians, women are at a disadvantage. Some will, of course, make the necessary sacrifices, but women are less likely to do so and statistical discrimination -the use of gender as a cue for your vote when information is incomplete --will magnify the problem because parties cannot know the true types among first-term PR with large districts, or smaller districts where votes are pooled across candidates, produces a very different dynamic that is more conducive to female representation.
There is little incentive for individual candidates to cater to local constituencies, and the party label becomes much more important in winning elections than the appeal of individual candidates. Likewise, programmatic parties will place more value on candidate loyalty to the party's platform, which in turn incentivizes them to nominate and promote politicians with relatively little independent political power -often with an eye to the symbolic value of adhering to norms such as gender equity. Voters always want effective candidates, of course, but what an effective candidate is depends on the political system.
Where the party label is of great electoral consequence, women are in no particular disadvantage since representatives (at least the backbenchers) are mostly asked to simply promote policies and vote for them when bills are sent to the floor. Parties can thus respond relatively easily to demands for gender equality (though perhaps less so at the leadership level).
In the next section, we develop these propositions empirically and test them on data from 23 advanced democracies beginning in 1945 (or at the inception of democracy if later).
Empirical Analysis
The dependent variable is the share of seats in national legislatures held by women, using legislative sessions as the unit of observation. Since nearly all the institutional variation is cross-cross, the effects of these mainly in differences across countries. We do, however, consider possible explanations for the cross-time trends, and we show that while female labor force participation and the rise of services have driven up female representation everywhere, this rise has been powerfully conditioned by the design of electoral institutions. exposed to political discussion and advocacy, which in turn encourages interest and involvement in politics. Some will also acquire skills through their work that are also useful for political careers. Although the number of women who end up running for national office is very small, most are recruited among those who are active in the labor market, so representation will likely rise with labor market participation. There may be a significant knock-on effect as women increasingly complete university degrees, which are important assets for launching successful political careers.
The second force of change the rise of service employment. As we have argued elsewhere, the breakdown of patriarchal values during the past half century is closely linked to the rise of services because these do not depend on physical strength and typically rely more on general than on firm or industry-specific skills. Since specific skills disadvantage women who cannot as easily commit to uninterrupted careers, and since most services rely on social rather than manual skills, postindustrialization has been a big boon for female labor force participation. But it has also had the effect of accelerating changes in gender norms. Because women compete on a more equal footing with men for jobs in services than in either manufacturing or agriculture, it has improved women's bargaining position in the family and encouraged caring parents to emphasize values in daughters that emphasize equality. Like boys for centuries, girls are increasingly taught to be assertive, acquire a good education, and prioritize financial independence. While these values certainly do not lead most women to seek political careers, they do tend to augment the pool of women from which political candidates will be recruited, and voters are less likely to be prejudiced against female candidates.
The importance of labor market participation and the rise of services for female representation can be easily ascertained in a model where we control for all crossnational differences using country-specific intercepts (or fixed effects). Model 1 in Table   1 Model (3) substitutes GDP per capita for service employment because we have data for all 23 countries on the former variable, but only for 21 countries on the latter. The correlation between the two variables is high (.77), and none of the other results presented in Table 1 are notably affected by using GDP per capita instead of service employment.7 The long-run predictions are also very similar. To maximize country coverage, and since we are primarily interested in the effects of political institutions, we therefore use GDP per capita in the rest of the analysis.
Model (4) substitutes the fixed effects for a number of political-institutional variables.
Since these display very little variance over time, we can only assess their cross-national effects by omitting the country-specific intercepts. Our attention centers on two measures of electoral systems.8 One is the size of electoral districts, standardized by dividing by the number of seats in the national assembly.9 The Netherlands is the only country in the dataset that treats the entire country as a single electoral district. In this case the value for the district size variable is therefore 1. As the number of candidates elected from each district shrinks, so does the electoral size variable -approaching 0 as we move towards single member districts. In cases where the electoral system has more than one tier, the measure is an average district magnitude across tiers weighted by the share of seats elected from each tier.
7 It is of course also possible that economic development itself drives up female representation, but we think it is plausible that the mechanism is still a rise in service employment (and female labor force participation) for the reasons spelled out above. Oil rich countries with high levels of income, for example, tend to be very gender inegalitarian. But for the rich democracies in our sample, economic development and employment structure are closely related, so one will always be a good proxy for the other. 8 Carey and Shugart (1995) developed a ranking of countries according to their assessment of the effects of a variety of electoral system attributes on the incentives of candidates to cultivate a personal vote. Their ranking is obviously relevant to our explanation, but it is based on a large number of (implicit) discretionary decisions about the importance of different variables, which can be contested. We prefer to keep the salient dimensions of the electoral system separate and let the data speak about salience. In the end, the composite variable we construct below is correlated with their ranking at a .85 level. We should also note that we are not directly using two of Carey and Shugart's variables: one they call "vote" and refers to "whether voters cast a single intra-party vote instead of multiple votes or a party-level vote", and one they call "ballot" and refers to whether parties control candidate access and position on a party list. There is practically no variance on the former variable in our sample. We discuss the relationship between the variables we use and the ballot or list variable below.
District size has a very obvious effect on the electoral strategies of political parties that is important to our story. Whereas it makes good sense to field candidates in SMD systems who can cater effectively to local interests, if the electoral district is the nation as a whole specialization of candidate appeals makes little sense. Even if a party caters to regional interests, or to other narrowly defined constituencies, individual candidates represent the party platform as opposed to their own local or personally cultivated constituencies. In turn, as the focus shifts from individual candidates to party platforms, voters lose interests in the attributes of the former and vote on policies and leadership competency instead.
Another electoral feature that affects the extent to which voters choose parties according Note that the effects of the two electoral variables are in the predicted direction and quite strong. Since both variables vary between 0 and 1 the interpretation of the estimated parameters are straightforward: Moving from the smallest to the largest electoral district increases the female share of seats in the legislature by an estimated 8 percent, while going from a system with no pooling of votes to one with pooling across all candidates increases female representation by 7 percent. As it turns out, the effects of the two variables can be almost fully captured by a simple additive index, which we have labeled "programmatic parties" (as opposed to "candidate-oriented" candidates) in Table 1 . The estimated parameter on this variable is between that of the two component variables, and since its range is twice that of the component variables so is its total effect. Specifically, going from an electoral system with the fewest incentives of parties to compete on party programs (SMD with no pooling) to one where these incentives are the strongest (a single national district with pooling across all candidates) raises the predicted representation of women by 15 percent, all else equal.
The analysis also includes controls for presidentialism and the share of seats in the legislature that are controlled by left parties.11 As noted in the theoretical section, there are long-standing arguments that presidentialism reduces the incentives of parties to enforce adherence to the party label since government power does not depend on maintaining a majority in the legislature. This increases the scope for, and presumably electoral salience of, individual legislators who can strike deals with other legislators through log-rolling and other deal-making. And, indeed, presidential systems have 4-5 percent fewer female representatives, all else being equal, than parliamentary systems.
Yet, it must be cautioned that since the only two countries in our sample with genuine presidential systems are France and the US and France, the presidentialism variable is simply a dummy for those two countries. That said, both political systems are known to have comparatively weak parties.
While one may reasonably have expected parties on the left to be more sensitive to gender equality, and while that may be true in particular cases, the effect of having higher left party representation is weak and in fact the opposite direction of the expectation.
Left parties may have had beneficial indirect effects on female representation through especially female labor force participation --which is partly linked to "women friendly"
policies such as public daycare provision --but they do not appear to have contributed much to improving gender equality in the legislature by advancing women farther through their own ranks than other parties.
Models (6) and (7) combine the structural forces of change with the cross-national institutional differences, using a methodology proposed by Blanchard and Wolfers (1999) .
In model (6) we reintroduce the fixed country effects, but we retain the institutional variable ("programmatic parties") as an interaction term with female labor force participation. All the variance in the dependent variable that can be accounted for by our explanatory variables is now inter-temporal, and what the institutional interaction variable tells us is whether pressure for change (represented by an increasing female share of the labor force) is accommodated or hindered in different institutional settings.
Indeed institutions do matter is this sense. The rate of change in representation in response to higher female employment is almost three times higher in systems with strong incentives for programmatic parties than when these incentives are absent (the coefficient on the female labor force variable rises from .37 to .98).
Finally, in model (7) women were largely outside the labor market. As they gradually enter into paid work, the variance in representation across countries rises. The reason for this divergence, we have suggested, comes down to differences in the design of political institutions, especially electoral rules. Where these incentivize parties to compete mainly on programmatic differences in policies, women fare far better than where parties delegate a lot of power and discretion to individual candidates. In the former countries, political gender equality is quickly catching up with economic equality: gender parity in employment is associated with more than 40 percent female representation. In the latter countries, female representation has trouble breaking above 10 percent. The US is a case in point. Although women have moving towards parity in terms of their share of jobs, they trail men in Congress by a daunting 14-86 margin. By contrast, women in Sweden have reached virtual parity in both spheres, even though Swedish women started out with fewer than 8 percent of seats in the legislature after the war. Note: The lower line is for candidate-oriented party systems, the top line is for programmatic-oriented party-systems.
Conclusions
Given that women have been subjected to unfavorable stereotyping and second class treatment for as long as history has kept track, outright discrimination would seem a reasonable explanation for why women are less likely than men to get elected to political office. We might expect that a shift in societal values towards greater gender egalitarianism would contribute both to a rise in female labor force participation and in female political representation at the same time. In rich democracies, particularly in the post World War II decades, women have indeed cut into male hegemony in labor markets as well as in politics. The correlation between the two phenomena is consistent with "demand side" theories that stress general attitudinal changes, and with "supply side" theories about the relevance of labor market skills and experience for political candidacy.
While there is much truth to these stories about changes in voter reception of female candidacy, the correlation between female success in labor markets and in politics fails to account for enormous cross national variation in female political representation. In some countries, such as in Scandinavia, female labor force participation and female political representation are powerfully correlated, whereas in other countries, such as the US, the slope of the curve is much flatter.
Our explanation for the gender gap in representation is very simple and uses the same logic for political careers that we know drives gender inequality in other careers. When jobs require uninterrupted tenures and long inflexible schedules, women are at a distinct disadvantage. Political parties in advanced democracies may have an ambition to encourage gender equality in representation, but just like firms competing in product markets they are sometimes constrained by electoral competition to put up candidates who are in a strong position to produce specialized constituency goods that require a long tenure and round the clock presence. The pool of qualified candidates for that type of job over-represents men, whether that job is in politics or in private enterprise. By contrast, where parties mainly compete on party labels there is no reason to prefer male over female candidates, at least for filling rank-and-file positions in the party. Ideological commitment and party loyalty are general qualities that do not differ systematically by gender.
The case of the US, where the ascent of women into middle management is not matched by female success in politics, illustrates our argument. American labor markets are characterized by an abundance of general skills jobs, for which women are competitive.
The same is not true of Congressional jobs. The reason, we have argued, is that the personalistic qualities of the American political system causes the same cast of characters-the American public-to make considerably less egalitarian choices in the ballot box than in the market place.
